..the Iran-Contra Affair cannot stand as a precedent for bypassing the constitutional requirement for appropriations. Securing funds, without Congressional authorization, to fund Government programs run by Government officials, is a direct violation of the Constitution that cannot be condoned.
Section 501 of National Security Act & Related Regulation..414
The Committees find that the failure to notify the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the covert action to support the Contras violated the Congressional notice provisions of Section 501 of the National Security Act; The statute provides:
The Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies and other entities of the United States involved in intelligence activities shall:
(1) keep the Select committee on Intelligence of the Senate and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by or are carried out for or on behalf of any department, agency, or entity of the United States, ..
The Contra covert operation..415
No notice of any kind was ever sent to Congress concerning the Contra covert action conducted by the NSC staff. On the contrary, the NSC staff took every step to keep Congress from discovering its activities. The covert action was carried out in violation of the Congressional notice provisions of the National Security Act.
The Iranian Arms Sales..415
The President did know of the Iran arms sales, and he made a deliberate decision not to notify Congress.
The DEA hostage rescue operation..416
Executive Order 12333, & NSDD 159..416
Violations of 18 USC Section 1001..416
The Diversion╤Boland Amendment..416
Proceeds of Arms Sales╤Funds of the US..417
The Committees find that the full proceeds of the arms sales to Iran belong to the U.S. Government. Consequently, these funds are governed by statutes applicable to Government funds, including statues prohibiting conversion of U.S. Government funds to unauthorized purposes. ..Consequently, it is the Committees' judgment that all funds derived from the proceeds of the sale of arms to Iran currently in the custody of the Enterprise or its representatives belong to the United States and by law should be returned to the United States Treasury forthwith.
Iran Arms Sales: Arms Export Control Act..418
The Committees find that the Administration's approval of the transfer of weapons to Iran by Israel violated the Arms Export Control Act. Under the AECA, the President may not provide [consent to transfer arms] unless: (1) the United States itself would transfer those arms to that country; (2) the transferee country (here Iran) agrees in writing that it will not further transfer the items without obtaining the consent of the President; and (3) the President notifies Congress of the transfer.
Violation of 18 USC Section 1505 & Presidential Records Act..419
Iran: The Presidential Records Act..419
Conclusion..419
references..421
28 Recommendations..423
1. Findings: Timely Notice..423
2. Written Findings..423
3. Disclosure of Written Findings to Congress..424
4. Findings: Agencies Covered..424
5. Findings: Identifying Participants..424
6. Findings: The Attorney General..424
7. Findings: Presidential Reporting..424
8. Recertification of Findings..424
9. Covert Actions Carried Out by Other Countries..424
10. Reporting Covert Arms Transfers..425
11. NSC Operational Activities..425
12. NSC Reporting to Congress..425
13. Privatization..425
14. Preservation of Presidential Documents..425
15. CIA Inspector General and General Counsel..425
16. Foreign Bank Records Treaties..425
17. National Security Council..426
18. Findings Cannot Supercede Law..426
19. Improving Consistency in Dealing with Security Breaches..426
20. Review of Congressional Contempt Statutes..426
21. Review of Special Compartmented Operations Within the Dept. of Defense..426
22. Review of Weapons Transfers by Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff..426
23. National Security Adviser..426
24. Intelligence Oversight Board..426
25. Review of Other Laws..426
26. Recommendations for Congress..426
27. Joint Intelligence Committee..427
+ Section II: The Minority Report
The Minority Views of: Mr. Cheney, Sen. McClure, Mr. Broomfield, Sen. Hatch, Mr. Hyde, Mr. Courter, Mr. McCollum, Mr. DeWine
- Part I Introduction
- Part II The Foreign Affairs Powers of the Constitution and the Iran-Contra Affair
- Organization and Conduct of the Committee's Investigation...683
+ Related Items
+ News
- ...GEnie news service Mon Aug 29
NEW IRAN-CONTRA BOOK CONCLUDES BUSH ENDORSED ARMS-FOR-HOSTAGES DEAL WASHINGTON (AUG. 29) AP -
The role of Vice President George Bush in the Iran-Contra affair remains an important unanswered question in the presidentialcampaign, according to a new book by two senators - a Democrat and a Republican- who investigated the scandal. The two authors, Maine senators William Cohen and George Mitchell, concludethat the Republican nominee should have been aware that an arms-for-hostagesdeal with Iran was being arranged and that he endorsed it.
Cohen, a Republican,and Mitchell, a Democrat, were members of the congressional Iran-Contra investigating panel and the first insiders to write their own book about the probe. ''The vice president endorsed the sale of weapons to Iran either out of loyalty to the president or because he, too, was consumed by the passion to obtain the freedom of the hostages,'' the two senators wrote in the book, ''Men of Zeal: A Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings.''
Bush campaign spokeswoman Sheila Tate said there would be no immediate comment on the book because ''we haven't seen it.'' Bush has sought to put the affair behind him, saying repeatedly that while he nominally was President Reagan's anti-terrorism chief, he was ''out of the loop'' on the Iran matter and didn't understand a briefing on the arrangements he received in August 1986, more than three months before the affair became public. But he also has refused to talk about any discussions with Reagan about the matter.
Cohen and Mitchell write that while it is possible Bush cautioned against the deal, evidence shows others in the administration were convinced that the vice president supported it. The book breaks little new ground about the hearings, but adds the perspective of two seasoned politicians on issues such as Bush's awkward political position as Reagan's No. 2, the mistakes made by the investigating panels in rushing the probe to beat deadlines and negotiating with cagey defense lawyers, and the panels' naive underestimation of how the hearings would play on television.
The senators note that no sitting vice president since Martin Van Buren in 1836 has been elected president, in part because of the conflict between the vice president's perceived role as second in command and the reality that he usually is relegated to the sidelines. =END=
